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SUMMARY OF APPELLANT'S REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S BRIEF 
The trial court erroneously concluded that a private 
agreement, State Farm's insurance policy, could nullify State 
law requiring a motorist to provide PIP benefits to those 
injured as a result of its insured's negligence. The 
exclusions in State Farm's policy on which it relies to deny 
coverage to Appellant are not allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-22-309(2)(a) and, therefore, State Farm must, under Utah 
law, provide PIP benefits on behalf of its insureds for 
Appellant's benefits. 
Even if State Farm could exclude the payment of PIP 
benefits to Appellant under its policy, (which it cannot) State 
Farm is ultimately and legally liable to provide PIP benefits 
on behalf of its insureds. Therefore, under Utah Code Ann § 
31A-22-309(6)(a)(1988), State Farm must reimburse Appellant for 
his payment of the PIP benefits on behalf of his deceased son 
for which State Farm's insureds, Rodney and Pat Grow, are 
legally liable. 
As set forth in Farmers Ins. Exchange v. Call, 712 
P.2d 231 (Utah 1985), State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. 
Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042 (Utah 1987), the legislative history of 
the No-Fault Act and the Act itself, the objective of insurance 
coverage and PIP benefits is to provide minimum benefits to all 
innocent victims of automobile accidents sustaining personal 
injuries without regard to fault and make such benefits 
available as expeditiously as possible. The only way such 
objective can lawfully be achieved is to reverse the lower 
court's summary judgment and enter judgment in Appellant's 
favor. 
REPLY TO RESPONDENT'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Respondent State Farm attempts to obfuscate the issues 
before the Court by a lengthy recitation of extraneous and 
irrelevant facts concerning the events leading to the 
automobile accident which claimed Christopher McCaffery's 
("Chris McCaffery") life. 
The relevant, undisputed facts in this case are: 
1. On August 27, 1989, Chris McCaffery, 
Appellant's son, was fatally injured in 
an automobile accident when the 
automobile in which he was a passenger 
impacted a tree at approximately 90 
miles an hour. (R. 130, 135, 146, 131, 
135.) . 
2. The driver of the automobile, Rodney 
Grow, did not own the automobile he was 
driving and did not have the automobile 
owner's permission to drive the 
automobile. (R. 130, 49, 50). 
3. At the time of the accident, State Farm 
insured Rodney Grow and his mother, Pat 
Grow, the signer of Rodney's driver's 
license application, for liabilities 
arising from the use of non-owned 
automobiles, which coverage included 
both liability coverage and personal 
injury protection coverage required by 
State law. (R. 71). 
4. Appellant Michael McCaffery, Chris 
McCaffery's father, has incurred $8,819 
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in special damages, which exceed the 
amounts provided under the Utah No-Fault 
Insurance Act. (R. 106). 
By its recitation of the events leading to Chris 
McCaffery's death, State Farm evidently attempts to impute to 
Chris some fault which would not entitle Chris, or his 
survivors, to coverage under the No-Fault Act. It would be 
anomolous, inconsistent and unjust to impute fault to McCaffery 
under a No-Fault Act. As stated by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Ivie, 606 P.2d 1196, 1200 (Utah 1980), 
"under [Utah's No-Fault Act] first party PIP benefits . . . are 
paid to an injured person without regard to fault. 
The additional facts cited by State Farm are 
irrelevant to the issue before the Court on appeal. It is 
undisputed that Chris McCaffery died as a result of Rodney 
Grow's negligence and that Rodney Grow was not using the 
automobile with permission. However, Grow and his mother are 
responsible to provide PIP benefits on behalf of Chris 
McCaffery in accordance with Utah law. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
MCCAFFERY IS ENTITLED TO PIP BENEFITS 
FROM GROW AND STATE FARM UNDER UTAH LAW 
State Farm asserts that Appellant confuses liability 
and PIP coverage, relying on its own insurance policy to 
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determine whether State Farm has complied with state law 
requiring it to provide PIP coverage on behalf of Rodney and Pat 
Grow for the benefit of Chris McCaffery, State Farm cites 
Osuala v. Aetna Life and Cas., 608 P.2d 242 (Utah 1980) for the 
proposition that McCaffery is not entitled to coverage. In 
Osuala, the plaintiff was the driver of the automobile, not a 
passenger as in the instant case and had violated the law by not 
maintaining his own insurance which would have provided PIP 
benefits to him as the driver of the automobile. As a 
passenger, McCaffery is not required to maintain any insurance 
to ride in an automobile. Grow's insurance provides certain 
minimum, mandatory coverage which includes PIP benefits. Every 
insurer licensed to issue policies in Utah must write a policy 
which complies with the required minimums found in Utah Code Ann 
§ 31A-22-302, which provides in part: 
Every policy of insurance or combination of 
policies, purchased to satisfy the owner's 
or operator's security requirement of § 
41-12A-301, shall also include personal 
injury protection under § 31A-22-306 though 
31A-22-309. 
Id. (emphasis added). In the Utah Supreme Court's most recent 
analysis and pronunciation concerning PIP benefits, the Court 
held: 
The statutory requirements found in Utah's 
No-Fault Insurance Act . . . as to minimum 
benefits must be provided to all persons 
sustaining personal injuries. 
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State Farm Mut. Auto, Ins. Co. v. Mastbaum, 748 P.2d 1042-43 
(Utah 1987) (emphasis added). Not surprisingly, State Farm 
would require every person, whether or not owning an automobile, 
to have insurance as a passenger in another person's automobile. 
Again, State Farm relies on its insurance policy to nullify 
specific state statute which allows only certain specific 
exclusions and cites Protective National Ins. Co. of Omaha v. 
Padron, 310 So.2d. 432 (Fla. App. 1975), a Florida case, as 
dispositive on Utah law. However, unlike Padron, Utah statute 
and case law specifically and unequivocally prohibit the very 
exclusion on which State Farm and Padron rely to deny PIP 
benefits to an injured person. Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309 
designates the exclusions an insurer may attach to a policy 
providing personal injury protection, § 309 providing in 
pertinent part: 
(2)(a) Any insurer issuing personal injury 
protection coverage under this part may only 
exclude from this coverage benefits: 
(i) for any injury sustained by the 
injured while occupying another motor 
vehicle owned by the insured and not insured 
under the policy; 
(ii) for any injury sustained by any 
person while operating the insured motor 
vehicle without the express or implied 
consent of the insured or while not in 
lawful possession the insured motor vehicle; 
or 
(iii) to any injured person, if the 
person's conduct contributed to his injury: 
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(A) by intentionally causing injury 
to himself; or 
(B) while committing a felony. 
(Emphasis supplied). Despite State Farm's protest to the 
contrary, the exclusion on which it relies is simply not 
allowed under Utah law. The Court need look no further than 
the plain language of the statute to determine that the 
exclusion is unlawful and impermissible and that McCaffery is 
entitled to PIP protection as a matter of law. State Farm 
cannot exclude itself from statutory requirements merely by 
waving its policy in an injured person's face. 
The discussion of Mastbaum in Appellant's initial 
brief and the cases cited therein are dispositive as to State 
Farm's statutory obligation to provide PIP coverage to 
McCaffery and further clarifies the permissible exclusions an 
insurer may make under Utah law. Under Utah law, State Farm, 
as the Grows' insurer, must provide PIP benefits on behalf of 
Chris McCaffery. 
The lower court erroneously granted sumamry judgment 
in State Farm's favor because it failed to recognize State Farm 
had unlawfully excluded Chris McCaffery from the mandatory PIP 
coverage. Accordingly, the trial court's summary judgment must 
be reversed and judgment entered in Appellant's favor Appellant 
awarding the PIP benefits to which he is entitled together with 
attorneys' fees, costs and interest assessed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309(5). 
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POINT II 
STATE FARM IS ULTIMATELY LIABLE FOR 
PAYMENT OF McCAFFERY'S PIP BENEFITS 
Although State Farm admits that McCaffery is entitled 
to PIP benefits under Utah law, State Farm asserts that 
McCaffery must look to his own insurer for PIP protection 
citing Osuala, supra, as the leading, and only, Utah case for 
that proposition. Even if State Farm were correct, which it is 
not, that McCaffery must first look to his own insurer for PIP 
protection, a careful reading of Osuala and applicable Utah 
statute reveals that State Farm would still be ultimately 
liable for the payment of Appellant's PIP benefits under the 
Grows' insurance policy. 
In Osuala, Plaintiff sought PIP from the insurer of 
the automobile with which Osuala had collided. The Utah 
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's summary judgment for 
defendant on the basis that Osuala had failed to comply with 
law and have mandatory insurance as a driver of the automobile. 
I n
 Osuala, the Utah Supreme Court recognized that although 
M[a]n important aspect of the [No-Fault Insurance] Act is the 
requirement that the PIP protections for an injured motorist 
are to be paid by his own insurer, . . . "[t]his is said in 
awareness that, under Section 31-41-11, [now § 
31A-22-309(6) (a)] this responsibility may be ultimately shifted 
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to a wrongdoer who causes the injury." Id, at 243 and at n.8. 
(emphasis added). State Farm cannot escape its liability and 
is ultimately liable for Appellant's PIP protection under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(a) which provides in relevant part 
that: 
Every policy providing personal injury 
protection coverage is subject to the 
following: 
(a) that where the insured under the policy 
is or would be held legally liable for 
the personal injuries sustained by any 
persons to whom benefits required under 
personal injury protection have been 
paid by another insurer, including the 
Workers' Compensation Fund of Utah, the 
insurer of the person who would be held 
legally liable shall reimburse the other 
insurer for the payment, but not in 
excess of the amount of damages 
recoverable . . . . 
Id. (emphasis added). 
As expressly recognized by the Utah Supreme Court in 
Osuala and as required by § 309(6)(a), the responsibility for 
the payment of PIP benefits "may be ultimately shifted to the 
wrongdoer who causes the injury." This is precisely the case 
here. There is no dispute that State Farm's insured was 
responsible for Chris McCaffery's fatal injuries and that 
Appellant's damages exceed those provided under PIP. State Farm 
must ultimately pay Appellant the PIP benefits to which he is 
entitled. 
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There is no absurd statutory requirement that Appellant 
first recover from his own insurer and then litigate the 
reimbursement to his insurer. Instead, Appellant brought suit 
against State Farm under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5) 
demanding that the statutory PIP benefits be paid directly to 
him by State Farm on behalf of its insureds, Rodney and Pat 
Grow. 
Inasmuch as State Farm admits that McCaffery is 
entitled to PIP under his own policy and Utah state law, and 
State Farm is ultimately responsible for such payment under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(6)(a), there is no perversion or 
contravention of policy, statute, contract or public policy by 
requiring State Farm to pay the PIP benefits directly to 
Appellant under Grows1 policy together with interest, costs and 
attorneys1 fees assessed under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-309(5). 
The lower court erred by not compelling State Farm to 
comply with its statutory duty and obligation and reimburse 
Appellant for the PIP benefits to be paid on behalf of his 
deceased son. The lower court's summary judgment must, 
therefore, be reversed and judgment granted in Appellant's favor 
for the benefits to which he is legally entitled and for which 
State Farm is, under any theory, legally responsible. 
-9-
POINT III 
McCAFFERY IS ENTITLED TO GENERAL DAMAGES 
AND PIP COVERAGE UNDER THE GROWS POLICY 
Appellant agrees with State Farm that "the only 
remaining issue is PIP coverage" and that "liability coverage 
and PIP coverage are two different issues." See Respondent's 
Brief at 14, 15. However, State Farm mistakenly believes that 
because Appellant has settled his claim for general damages, he 
is not entitled to any PIP benefits. The record and rulings of 
the Utah Supreme Court hold differently. Appellant specifically 
reserved his claim for PIP benefits against State Farm, the 
explicit language of the Release of All Claims providing: 
The undersigned [appellant] specifically 
reserves his claims for no-fault insurance 
benefits, including claims for costs and 
attorney's fees arising therefrom, if any, 
against State Farm Mutual Automobile 
Insurance Company . . . . 
Of the Release's ten paragraphs, seven cite that all claims are 
released "except for those claims specifically reserved against 
Defendant State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company." The 
Release could not have set forth with more actual specificity 
that Appellant was reserving his claim for PIP against State 
Farm. Moreover, the Court's Order of Dismissal recited: 
2. Plaintiff's Complaint against Defendant 
State Farm Insurance Company for no-fault 
insurance benefits arising out of the 
no-fault statute of the State of Utah, and 
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all of State Farm's defenses to such claims 
are reserved and remain pending in this 
litigation . . . . 
See Release, Addendum to Respondent's Brief at 7. 
Finally, dispositive of State Farm's fallacious 
argument is the Utah Supreme Court's ruling in Allstate Ins. Co. 
v. Ivie, 606 P.2d. 1197 (Utah 1980) wherein the Court held: 
The tort-feasor's liability insurer, in 
fulfilling its duty to respond to the claims 
of injured party to the limits of its policy, 
stands in the shoes of its insured and pays 
on the basis of its insured's personal 
liability to the tort victim; this personal 
liability does not include PIP payments. 
Thusf the tort victim's recovery from the 
liability insurer cannot be reduced by the 
PIP payments. 
Id. at 1203. (Emphasis added). 
McCaffery, as was intended, released the Grows from 
their liability for general damages and specifically reserved 
his claims against State Farm for its wrongful denial of PIP 
benefits from McCaffery which State Farm is required to pay and 
for which it is ultimately responsible for under Utah law. State 
Farm cannot pay two separate, distinct claims with the same 
dollar. The claim against State Farm for PIP benefits was not 
settled or released by McCaffery. The issue remains pending in 
this appeal. 
POINT IV 
STATE FARM, AS PAT GROWS INSURER, 
IS LIABLE FOR THE PAYMENT OF PIP 
BENEFITS TO APPELLANT 
State Farm asserts that Pat Grow is absolved from her 
joint and several liability with her son for Chris McCaffery's 
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fatal injuries and all damages arising therefrom merely by 
providing automobile insurance for her son. State Farm 
misreads the plain language of Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(3) and 
fails to consider the provisions and requirements of Utah Code 
Ann. § 41-12a-402. 
State Farm relies on Utah Code Ann. § 
41-2-115(3) which provides: 
(3) If a minor deposits, or there is 
deposited on his behalf, proof of financial 
responsiblity, in respect to the operation of 
a motor vehicle he owns, or with respect to 
the operation of any motor vehicle if he does 
not own one, in form and in amounts as 
required under Chapter 12a, Title 41, 
Financial Responsibility of Motor Vehicle 
Owners and Operators Act, the division may 
accept the application of the minor when 
signed by a parent or guardian of the minor. 
While the proof is maintained, that person is 
not subject to the liability imposed under 
Subsection (2)• 
I^ d. (emphasis added). 
However, Utah Code Ann. § 41-2-115(3) must be read in 
conjunction with Utah Code Ann. § 41-12a-402 to understand the 
specific conditions precedent the protection afforded by Section 
115(3). Utah Code Ann. § 41-12d-402 reads: 
Proof of owner's or operator's security may 
be furnished by filing with the department 
the written certificate of any insurer 
licensed in Utah certifying that there is in 
effect an insurance policy or combination of 
policies conforming to Section 31A-22-302 for 
the benefit of the person required to furnish 
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proof of owner's or operator's security. This 
certificate shall be furnished to the 
department in the form of an SR-22 issued by 
any insurer licensed in Utah. The 
certificate shall give each policy number and 
the effective date of each policy. The 
effective date of the policy may not be later 
than the effective date of the certificate. 
The certificate shall designate by explicit 
description or by appropriate reference all 
motor vehicles covered, unless the policy is 
issued to a person who is not the owner of a 
motor vehicle. 
(Emphasis added). There is absolutely no evidence before this 
court, and there was none before the lower court, that the 
Grows complied with Section 41-12a-402 and Mfil[ed] with the 
department the written certificate of any insurer 
certifying that there is in effect an insurance policy . . . 
for the benefit of the person required to furnish proof of 
owner's or operator's security." No "SR-22" exists as required 
by Section 402. Pat Grow is vicariously liable for her son's 
negligence unless Rodney Grow before submitted his application, 
deposited proof of financial responsibility in respect to the 
operation of a motor vehicle he owns, or with respect to the 
operation of any motor vehicle if he does not own one . . . ." 
Rodney Grow never complied with the statute to invoke its 
protection. Had such a deposit been made by Rodney Grow "with 
respect to the operation of any vehicle," Chris McCaffery would 
be covered by Grow's policy and receive PIP protection even 
though Grow was not driving the automobile because, under Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-22-303(1)(b)(ii), the policy must cover any 
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automobile Rodney Grow drives. Therefore, the automobile 
involved in the accident claiming Chris McCaffery's life would 
be a "motor vehicle described in the policy" (i.e. any motor 
vehicle Grow was driving) under Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-308, 
thereby entitling Chris McCaffery to PIP benefits under the 
same section. However, there is absolutely no evidence before 
this court or before the lower court that such deposit was ever 
made by Grow prior to filing his driver's license application. 
Under State Farm's argument, Pat Grow is absolved of 
joint and several liability with her son Rodney merely by his 
compliance with Utah Code Ann. § 31A-22-302 which mandates 
minimum automobile insurance coverage. If such were the case, 
there would be absolutely no need for Utah Code Ann. § 
41-2-115(3), its provisions rendered meaningless by mere 
compliance with § 302 and § 402 would be unnecessary. However, 
because it is presumed under the rules of statutory 
construction that each statute has a purpose and significance, 
State Farm's argument fails. By requiring the deposit of 
independent financial responsiblity in the form of Form SR-22 
to be made before the acceptance of a driver's license 
application, alL statutes are harmonized and retain their 
underlying purpose and legislative significance. Section 
41-2-115(3) unequivocally requires the independent deposit to 
be "in the form and in amounts as required by Chapter 12A, 
Title 41" viz. Form SR-22. No deposit in compliance with 
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Section 41-2-115(3) was ever made and, therefore, Pat Grow is 
jointly and severally liable under § 41-2-115(2) for her son's 
negligence and any damages caused by such negligence, including 
the payment of PIP benefits to injured persons. 
No matter the theory, defense or argument, it is 
undisputed Rodney Grow caused Chris McCaffery's fatal injuries. 
Therefore, State Farm, Grows1 insurer, is ultimately liable for 
the payment of PIP benefits to the person paying such benefits, 
Appellant Michael McCaffery. 
CONCLUSION 
In Osuala v. Aetna Life and Cas., supra, the Utah 
Supreme Court outlined rules of statutory construction and 
enunciated public policy which are dispositive to the specific 
issue before this court on appeal. The court held: 
There are some cardinal rules of statutory 
construction to be considered in relation to 
this controversy. If there is doubt or 
uncertainty as to the meaning or application 
of the provisions of an act, it is 
appropriate to analyze the act in its 
entirety, in the light of its objective, and 
to harmonize its provisions in accordance 
with the legislative intent and purpose. A 
further basic rule to be applied in 
connection therewith is that specific 
provisions prevail over more general 
expressions. 
Id. at 243 (footnotes omitted). Utah Code Ann. § 31-A-22-309 
only allow certain specific exclusions under any insurance 
policy providing PIP benefits. The exclusion on which State 
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Farm relies to deny PIP benefits to Appellant is not found in 
those specific exclusions. Because the specific exclusions 
prevail over any other general exclusions or statutory reference 
pertaining to PIP benefits, State Farm must provide the PIP 
benefits to Appellant. Furthermore, consistent with the 
guidelines outlined in Osuala to "analyze the [No-Fault 
Insurance] act in its entirety," in light of its objective and 
in order to harmonize its provisions in accordance with the 
legislative intent and purpose of the Act, regarding the 
No-Fault Insurance Act, the Utah Supreme Court found in Osuala 
that: 
The stated purposes of the No-Fault Insurance 
Act are to effectuate savings in the 
ever-increasing costs of automobile 
insurance, and to minimize the difficulties 
and hardships that often result from delays 
in the determination of fault, by providing 
for expeditious payment to injured persons of 
certain basic expenses and loss of income 
(refereed to as PIP's) without regard to 
fault. 
Id. (footnotes omitted, emphasis added). In order "to minimize 
the difficulties and hardship" resulting to Appellant by his 
payment of the medical and funeral expenses on behalf of his 
son, to compensate him for his son's untimely and tragic death, 
and to provide the most expeditious method of payment directly 
to him, judgment must be entered against State Farm for the PIP 
benefits which it is legally and contractually obligated to pay 
on behalf of its insureds, Rodney and Pat Grow. 
-16-
Instead, State Farm has chosen to hide behind its 
ambiguous and unlawful insurance policy to deny Appellant the 
PIP benefits he paid on behalf of his son which State Farm 
admits he is entitled to and for which State Farm, under 
statute, is ultimately liable to pay under Utah Code Ann. § 
31A-33-309(6)(d). 
The lower court's summary judgment must be reversed and 
judgment entered in Appellant's favor for $7,500 together with 
interest, costs and attorneys' fees assessed under Utah Code 
Ann. § 31A-22-309(5) . _ ^ 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
3o 
day of January, 1989. 
JARDINE, LINEBAUGH, BROWN & DUNN 
R. BROWN 
HAROLD L. REISER 
Attorneys for Appellant 
HLR-P796 
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